国务院


国务院关于口岸开放的若干规定(附英文)

1985年9月18日，国务院

规定
随着我国对外贸易、国际交往和旅游事业的发展，将进一步开放新的口岸。为加强口岸开放的审批工作，特制定本规定。
一、本规定所指口岸是供人员、货物和交通工具出入国境的港口、机场、车站、通道等。口岸分为一类口岸和二类口岸。一类口岸是指由国务院批准开放的口岸（包括中央管理的口岸和由省、自治区、直辖市管理的部分口岸）；二类口岸是指由省级人民政府批准开放并管理的口岸。
二、口岸的开放和关闭，由国务院或省级人民政府审批后公布执行。
三、凡开放口岸，应根据需要设立边防检查、海关、港务监督、卫生检疫、动植物检疫、商品检验等检查检验机构，以及国家规定的其他口岸机构。
四、两类口岸的具体划分：
（一）以下为一类口岸：
1、对外国籍船舶、飞机、车辆等交通工具开放的海、陆、空客货口岸；
2、只允许我国籍船舶、飞机、车辆出入国境的海、陆、空客货口岸；
3、允许外国籍船舶进出我国领海内的海面交货点。
（二）以下为二类口岸：
1、依靠其他口岸派人前往办理出入境检查检验手续的国轮外贸运输装卸点、起运点、交货点；
2、同毗邻国家地方政府之间进行边境小额贸易和人员往来的口岸；
3、只限边境居民通行的出入境口岸。
五、报批程序：
（一）一类口岸：由有关部（局）或港口、码头、车站、机场和通道所在地的省级人民政府会商大军区后，报请国务院批准，同时抄送国务院口岸领导小组、总参谋部和有关主管部门。
（二）二类口岸：由口岸所在地的人民政府征得当地大军区和海军的同意，并会商口岸检查检验等有关单位后，报请省级人民政府批准。批文同时送国务院口岸领导小组和有关主管部门备案。
六、报批开放口岸应附具下列资料：
（一）对口岸开放进行的可行性研究报告，以及口岸的基本条件、近三年客货运量、经济效益和发展前景的资料。
（二）根据客货运输任务提出的有关检查检验单位、口岸办公室、中国银行等机构设置和人员编制方案。
（三）检查检验场地和办公、生活设施等规划，以及投资预算和资金来源。
七、对外开放前的验收：
（一）新开放的口岸，在开放前必须对其交通安全设施、通信设施、联检场地、检查检验等单位的机构设置和人员配备，以及办公、生活设施等进行验收。验收合格后，才能宣布开放。
（二）一类口岸，由国务院口岸领导小组办公室负责组织验收；二类口岸，由所在省、自治区、直辖市口岸办公室或其他主管口岸工作的部门负责组织验收。
八、临时进出我国非开放区域的审批权限：
（一）临时从我国非开放的港口或沿海水域进出的中、外国籍船舶，由交通部审批，并报国务院口岸领导小组备案。报批前应征得军事主管部门和当地人民政府以及有关检查检验单位的同意，并安排好检查检验工作。
（二）临时从我国非开放机场起降的中、外国籍民用飞机，由中国民用航空局征得军事主管部门同意后审批，非民用飞机由军事主管部门审批，并报国务院口岸领导小组备案。报批前应征得当地人民政府和有关检查检验部门的同意，并安排好检查检验工作。
（三）临时从我国非开放的陆地边界区域进出境的中、外国籍车辆和人员，由省级人民政府审批。报批前应征得当地省军区和公安部门的同意，并安排好检查检验工作。
九、口岸开放应有计划地进行，按隶属关系分别列入国家或地方口岸开放计划。国务院有关部门和省、自治区、直辖市应将口岸开放计划（草案），于计划年度前两个月报国务院口岸领导小组，并抄报国家计委、劳动人事部和检查检验单位的有关主管部门。
十、开放口岸检查检验设施建设资金来源：
（一）中央管理的口岸，由中央负责解决；地方管理的口岸，由地方负责解决。
（二）国家新建开放的港口、码头、车站和机场（含军用改为军民合用的机场）等口岸建设项目（包括利用外资和中外合资项目），以及老口岸新建作业区和经济开发区的新港区等项目，所需联检场地应与港口、码头、车站、机场等主体工程统一规划。所需投资包括在主体工程之内。
检查检验单位办公、生活土建设施（包括宿舍）的投资，由口岸建设项目的主管部门组织有关单位研究，统一汇总报国家计委审批。批准后，投资划拨给口岸所在地的省、自治区、直辖市，由地方统一规划，统一设计施工。军用改建为军民合用机场的口岸项目，应事先征得空军或海军同意，如在机场内建设，建设单位可提出要求，由空军或海军统一规划。
（三）各部（局）直属的原有港口、码头、车站和机场需要对外开放时，所需联检场地，原则上要利用原有建筑设施。如确需扩建、新建，应由港口、码头、车站和机场的主管部门投资建设。检查检验单位的办公、生活土建设施（包括宿舍）的投资，原则上由各自主管部门解决。对确有困难的，国家或地方给予适当补助，由地方统一建设，投资交地方包干使用。
（四）地方新开口岸，所需联检场地和检查检验单位的办公、生活土建设施（包括宿舍），由地方统一投资，统一建设。
（五）国际海员俱乐部的建设规划和投资来源，比照（二）、（三）、（四）项规定解决。
（六）检查检验单位所需的交通工具、仪器设备等，由各自主管部门解决。
（七）联检场地内，划给检查检验单位的办公和业务用房（包括水、电、市内电话），应由港口、码头、车站和机场（包括军民合用的机场）的经营单位免费提供。
十一、本规定由国务院口岸领导小组办公室负责解释。
十二、本规定自发布之日起施行。

PROVISIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON THE OPENING OF PORTS

Important Notice: (注意事项)
英文本源自中华人民共和国务院法制局编译, 中国法制出版社出版的《中华人民
共和国涉外法规汇编》(1991年7月版).
当发生歧意时, 应以法律法规颁布单位发布的中文原文为准.
This English document is coming from the "LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-RELATED MATTERS" (1991.7)
which is compiled by the Brueau of Legislative Affairs of the State
Council of the People's Republic of China, and is published by the China
Legal System Publishing House.
In case of discrepancy, the original version in Chinese shall prevail.

Whole Document (法规全文)
PROVISIONS OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON THE OPENING OF PORTS
(Promulgated on September 18, 1985)
With the development of our foreign trade, international exchanges and
tourisms, more ports will be opened. These Provisions are formulated in
order to strengthen the work in the examination and approval for opening
ports to foreign countries.
1. The term "ports" referred to in these Provisions denotes the harbours,
airports, stations, thoroughfares, etc., which are used for personnel,
goods or means of transport to enter or leave the country. The ports in
our country are divided into two categories. Category-1 ports refer to
those ports which have been opened upon the approval of the State Council
(including those administered by the Central Government and some of the
ports administered by the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities
directly under the Central Government); category-2 ports refer to those
ports which have been opened upon approval by the people's governments at
the provincial level and are administered by them.
2. The opening and closing of ports shall be announced and executed after
the examination and approval by the State Council or the people's
governments at the provincial level.
3. Organs in charge of frontier inspection, Customs, harbour
superintendency, quarantine, quarantine for animals and plants, commodity
inspection, etc., as well as other port organs stipulated by State shall
be set up at the open ports according to the actual needs.
4. Criteria for the division of the two categories of ports:
(1) The following are category-1 ports:
A. ports open to vessels, planes, vehicles and other means of transport of
foreign nationality used to transport passengers and goods into or out of
China through sea, land or air;
B. ports for use only by Chinese vessels, planes and vehicles transporting
passengers and goods out of or into the country through sea, land or air;
C. spots on the sea within our territorial waters where vessels of foreign
nationality are allowed to enter or leave for the purpose of delivering
goods.
(2) The following are category-2 ports:
A. spots for loading and unloading, starting shipment and delivering goods
for Chinese vessels engaged in foreign trade where the formalities for
exit and entry inspection and examination are conducted by personnel sent
from other ports;
B. ports where border trade in small amounts and contacts between people
are carried out with local governments of neighbouring countries;
C. ports restricted to the exit or entry of the local residents in the
border areas.
5. The procedures for report and approval:
(1) Category-1 ports: the relevant ministries (or bureaus) or the people's
governments of the provinces where the harbours, wharves, stations,
airports and thoroughfares in question are situated shall, after
consultation with the military area commands, submit the application to
the State Council for approval, with copies of the application sent to the
Leading Group for Port Affairs of the State Council, the Headquarters of
the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and the relevant
competent departments.
(2) Category-2 ports: The people's governments of the regions where the
ports in question are situated shall first obtain the agreement of the
military area commands concerned and the Navy, and hold consultations with
the units in charge of port inspection and examination. Applications shall
then be submitted to the people's governments at the provisional level for
approval, with copies of which sent to the Leading Group for Port Affairs
under the State Council and the relevant competent departments for the
record.
6. The following materials should be attached to application for opening a
port:
(1) A feasibility report, the materials concerning the basic conditions of
the ports, the volume of passenger transport and freight volume in the
last three years, and the potential economic results and the prospects for
development.
(2) The plan for the establishment of such port organs as offices in
charge of inspection and examination, offices for port affairs and
branches of the Bank of China, according to the task for transporting
passengers and goods.
(3) Plans for constructing inspection and examination grounds and for
building facilities for office work and the daily life of the staff
members, as well as investment budget and source of funds.
7. Final check-up and acceptance before a port is opened:
(1) Before a new port is opened, the establishment of organs and the
provisions of staff members of offices in charge of traffic safety, for
telecommunications, combined inspection and examination as well as
facilities for office work and daily life must go through the procedure of
final check-up and acceptance. New ports may be opened only after the
facilities are finally checked and accepted.
(2) The office of the Leading Group for Port Affairs of the State Council
shall be responsible for the check-up and acceptance of category-1 ports.
The offices for port affairs in the provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities directly under the Central Government or other competent
departments in charge of port affairs shall be responsible for the check-
up and acceptance of category-2 ports.
8. The competence for examination and approval of applications for
temporarily entry and exit at the non-open areas of our country:
(1) Applications by vessels of Chinese or foreign nationality for
temporarily entry or exit at non-open harbours or coastal waters of China
shall be examined and approved by the Ministry of Communications and
reported to the Leading Group for Port Affairs of the State Council for
the record. Before the applications are submitted for approval, the
agreement of the competent authorities for military affairs, the local
people's governments and the relevant units in charge of examination and
inspection shall be obtained, and the details of the examination and
inspection work shall be arranged.
(2) Applications by civil planes of Chinese or foreign nationality for
temporarily take-offs or landings at China's non-open airports shall be
examined and approved by the Civil Aviation Administration of China,
which, however, should obtain the agreement of the competent authorities
for military affairs. Applications by non-civil planes shall be examined
and approved by the competent authorities for military affairs. Both kinds
of applications must be reported to the Leading Group for Port Affairs of
the State Council for the record. Before the applications are submitted
for approval, the agreement of the local people's governments and the
relevant departments for examination and inspection should be obtained,
and the details of the examination and inspection work shall be arranged.
(3) Applications by vehicle and personnel of Chinese or foreign
nationality for temporarily entry and exit at our non-open border areas on
land shall be examined and approved by the people's governments at the
provincial level. Before the applications are submitted for approval, the
agreement of the relevant provincial military area command and the
department of public security shall be obtained, and the details of the
examination and inspection work shall be arranged.
9. New ports shall be opened according to the relevant State or local
plans. The competent departments under the State Council, and the
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the
Central Government, shall send plans (drafts) of opening ports to the
Leading Group for Port Affairs of the State Council two months before a
planned year begins, with copies sent to the State Planning Commission,
the Ministry of Labour and Personnel and the relevant competent
departments of the units in charge of inspection and examination.
10. The sources of funds for building facilities for inspection and
examination at the open ports:
(1) The Central Government shall be responsible for providing the funds
for the ports under its administration. The local people's governments
shall be responsible for providing funds for the ports under their
administration.
(2) Where grounds for combined inspection and examinations are needed in
such port construction projects (including projects with foreign
investment and Chinese and foreign equity joint-venture projects) as
harbours, wharves, railway stations and airports (including those which
have been transformed from military airports used for both military and
civilian purposes) as well as in such projects as newly-built operation
areas at old ports and new harbour areas in economic development zones,
the construction of these grounds shall be incorporated into the plans of
the main projects of the prescribed harbours, wharves, railway stations
and airports. The investment needed for the construction of these grounds
shall be incorporated in the investment for the main projects. The
competent departments for port construction projects shall organize the
relevant units to carry out research on the investment structure for the
construction of the facilities for office work and for the daily life of
the staff members (including dormitories) of the units in charge of
inspection and examination and present itemized reports to the State
Planning Commission for examination and approval. After the approval is
obtained, the investment shall be transferred to the provinces, autonomous
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government where the
ports are situated. The local people's governments shall be responsible
for the unified planning, designing and construction of the ports. Where
military airports are to be transformed into airports for both military
and civilian purposes, agreement should be obtained from the Air Force or
the Navy beforehand. In the case that the construction is to be carried
out within the airports, the units responsible for the construction may
submit draft plans, which shall be incorporated in the unified plans of
the Air Force or the Navy.
(3) Where the existing harbours, wharves, railway stations and airports
directly under the administration of various ministries (or bureaus) need
to be opened, the grounds for combined inspection and examination for
these ports shall, in principle, be set up by making use of the existing
buildings and facilities. If it is necessary to extend the original
buildings or build new grounds for combined inspection and examination,
the competent departments for the harbours, wharves, railway stations and
airports shall be responsible for the investment. The investment for the
construction of the facilities for office work and the daily life of the
staff members (including dormitories) of the units in charge of inspection
and examination shall, in principle, be provided by their respective
competent departments. In the extreme cases of difficulty with respect to
investment, the State or the local governments may provide appropriate
subsidies. The investment shall be turned over to the relevant people's
governments, which are held responsible for the completion of the
construction.
(4) The local people's governments shall be responsible for the investment
and construction of the grounds for combined inspection and examination
and the infrastructure facilities for office work and the daily life of
the staff members (including dormitories) of the units in charge of
inspection and examination, which are needed in their newly-opened ports.
(5) The construction plans and sources of investment for international
seamen's clubs shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of
Paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this Article.
(6) The means of transport, instruments, equipment, etc., needed by the
units in charge of inspection and examination shall be provided by their
respective competent departments.
(7) Within grounds for combined inspection and examination, the rooms for
office work and other related purposes (including water, electricity and
inner-city telephone) which have been assigned to the units in charge of
inspection and examination shall be provided free of charge by the
business units of the harbours, wharves, railway stations and airports
(including those used for both military and civilian purposes).
11. These Provisions shall be interpreted by the office of the Leading
Group for Port Affairs of the State Council.



Student:Dayong Zhou

dayong_77@hotmail.com


The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China

周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)

Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete

Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.